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A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Strategic Games

Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny’s better-reply security condition Reny (Econometrica 1999). On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games to endogenous tie-breaking rules in mixed strategies [Simon and Zame (Econometrica, 1990). We also provide conditions for existence of approximated Nash equilibria and apply the results to auctions and diagonal games.

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Auteurs : Rida Laraki (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique) Philip Bich (Univérsité Paris 1 Sorbonne)


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